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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD #2A - 8/15/79 
In the Matter.of 
NEW YORK STATE COURT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and-
RICHARD J. BARTLETT, as Chief Administrator 
of the Courts of the State of New York and 
HOWARD A. RUBENSTEIN.as. ; Director of Employee 
Relations of the Office of Court Administration, 
Respondents. 
In the Matter of 
RICHARD J. BARTLETT, as Chief Administrative 
Judge of the Unified Court System of the 
State of New York, 
Charging Party, 
-and-
NEW YORK STATE COURT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent:.
 ; 
WHITEMAN, OSTERMAN & HANNA (MELVIN H. OSTERMAN, JR., ESQ. 
and NORMA MEACHAM CROTTY, ESQ., of Counsel) for the 
Office of Court Administration 
PHILLIPS, NIZER, BENJAMIN, KRIM & BALLON, (ALBERT H. BLUMENTHAL, 
ESQ., STEPHANIE D. HILL, ESQ., and GEOFFREY McC. JOHNSON, ESQ., 
of Counsel) for New York State Court Employees Association 
On December 1, 1978, the New York State Court Employees Association (Asso-
ciation filed an improper practice charge in Case No. U-3714, alleging that 
Richard J. Bartlett and Howard A. Eubenstein (respondents),as Chief Administra-
tive Judge of the State's unified court system and Director of Employee 
Relations of the State Office of Court Administration (OCA) , respectively, re-
BOARD DECISION AND 
ORDER 
CASE NO. U-3714 
CASE NO. U-3767 
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fused to negotiate with respect to various Association demands concerning 
mandatory subjects of negotiation. Respondents .filed an answer asserting that 
the subject demands are not mandatorily negotiable and subsequently, on 
January 3, 1979, filed a charge in Case No. U-3767 alleging that the Association 
had violated- its duty to negotiate in good faith by insisting upon the 
negotiation of prohibited or : ;nonmandatory subjects. 
A pre-hearing conference was held on January 15, 1979, during which the 
parties agreed upon a statement of the demands at. issue. Since the matter 
primarily involves the-; scope of negotiations under the Taylor Law, it has 
been referred directly to us for agxpeditious determination pursuant to 
§204.4 of our Rules, without an intermediate hearing officer's report. 
Both parties participated in oral argument and submitted written briefs. 
BACKGROUND 
The Association is comprised of four separate employee organizations: the 
New York State Court Clerks Association; the Court Clerks Benevolent Associa-
tion, Local 584, SEIU, AFL-CIO; the New York State.Supreme Court Officers 
Association; and Local 598, SEIU, AFL-CIO. These organizations were jointly 
certified by the New York City Office of Collective Bargaining as negotiating 
representatives of nonjudicial court employees in the City of New York. 
OCA and the City of New York were joint employer signatories to a 1976-78 
collective agreement with the latter"three organizations; the'New York State 
Court Clerks Association has not been a party to an agreement since 1976, 
Prior to April 1, 1977, individual local governments were responsible for 
the operating costs of courts of the unified court system located within their 
respective jurisdictions. Heheejthe employees herein represented by the Asso-
ciation were paid by the City of-New York. On.August 5, 1976, however, the State 
Legislature, finding that "[i]t is both uneconomical and inefficient to have 
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the responsibility of funding this state-operated court system divided among 
1 
the various units of local governments", passed the Unified Court Budget Act 
(herein also referred to as the Judiciary Law). Under this Act, the State 
assumed the operating costs of all State courts of record, and, effective 
April 1, 1977, nonjudicial employees in such courts, including those repre-
sented by the Association, became State-paid employees with OCA as their sole 
immediate employer. The Judiciary Law also contains significant language 
concerning the classification of these new State employees and their allocation 
to salary grades. That language, at the core of these proceedings, will be 
discussed in detail, infra. 
On or about October 11, 1977, OCA and the Association commenced successor 
contract negotiations. During such negotiations, a dispute arose concerning 
numerous Association demands, many of which involved employee classification 
and allocation. The dispute led to the filing of the instant charges. 
CLASSIFICATION AND ALLOCATION 
As noted, at the heart of the dispute between the parties is the question 
of whether employer decisions concerning classification and allocation are 
mandatory subjects of negotiation. OCA claims that specific provisions con-
tained within the Judiciary Law mandate that these matters be left within its 
sole province. The Association contends that other provisions of that Law 
dictate a contrary conclusion. 
Classification 
Classification has been defined in the personnel provisions of the Civil 
Service Law as "a grouping together, under common and descriptive titles, of 
positions that are substantially similar in the essential character and scope 
1 L. 1976, ch. 966, enacting Judiciary Law §220. This section was later re-
numbered as Judiciary Law, §39 (L. 1978, ch. 156). 
5860 
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of their duties and responsibilities and in the qualification requirements 
2 
therefor". It thus involves first the devising of a personnel structure based 
on general occupational function, and then the determination of which individ-
ual positions are to be assigned to which particular functional group. By way 
of example, in the instant case OCA has proposed for the negotiating unit under 
consideration nine major functional groupings or "occupational series", 
including those of court clerk, office assistant, court security, court 
reporter, court interpreter, secretarial and stenographic, legal, administra-
tive, and law librarian, and has assigned specific job titles to each of these 
groups on the basis of proposed "title standards" which detail distinguishing 
features, typical duties, requisite skills and qualifications for each posi-
3 
tion. 
To. determine the negotiability of classification decisions under the 
Taylor Law, we resort to the primary-characteristic test used in all scope of 
negotiations cases: Is the particular type of decision primarily related to 
the terms and conditions of employment of those affected by it, or is it 
primarily related to the formulation or management of public policy, i.e. to 
4 
the exercise of governmental "mission". We perceive the decision as to how 
employees shall be classified as having predominantly the latter character-
2 Civil Service Law §2.11. 
_3 See, "Proposed Classification Plan for Non-Judicial Positions in the Unified 
Court System'! and "proposed Title Standards for Non-Judicial Employees in 
the Unified Court System". 
4^  See, e.g., Saratoga Springs City School District, 11 PERB 1(3037 (1978), 
aff'd 68 AD 2d 202, 12 PERB 1(7008 (3rd Dept., 1979), mt. Iv. app. den. 
NY2d , 12 PERB 1(7012 (1979). 
5861 
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istic, and hence as being a nonmandatory subject of negotiation under the 
Taylor Law. 
Classification is clearly a personnel management tool which facilitates 
the ascertainment of staffing needs within particular areas of an employer's 
operation. It is closely allied to the setting of job qualifications, the 
promulgation of job: descriptions characterizing employees' essential duties 
and functions and the creation of a table of organization — all of which we 
have previously held to constitute nonmandatory subjects of negotiation. 
Moreover, classification as such does not establish, and does not have a direct 
impact upon, terms and conditions of employment. While a particular occupa-
tional grouping might reflect a higher average rate of compensation than 
another due to the nature of duties and level of qualifications of the posi-
tions it comprises, this would be due not to the classification decision itself, 
but rather to subsequent processes of contract salary negotiations and alloca-
tion to salary grade. On analysis then, by Taylor Law principles, employee 
classification is not a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
We next examine whether other statutory provisions dictate a contrary 
conclusion here. Judiciary Law §39.8(a) reads as follows with respect to 
classification: 
"The administrative board of the judicial conference shall adopt a 
classification structure for all non-judicial officers and employees 
who become employees of the state of New York pursuant to this section 
which shall provide for the classification of positions in accordance 
with duties required to be performed in title in these positions and 
in accordance with the responsibilities of the position and the volume 
of work in the court or court-related agency in which the position 
exists. Nothing in this section shall prohibit the subsequent re-
structuring of the classification and duties of employees in accord-
ance with the rules of the administrative board." 
5_ West Irondequoit Board of Education, 4 PERB 113070 (1971); Waverly Central 
School District, 10 BERB 1f3103 (1977); Onondaga Comm. Coll. Federation of 
Teachers, 11 PERB 1(3045 (1978). 
5862 
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-This statute explicitly authorizes the employer to promulgate a classification 
scheme for nonjudicial employees. Since, as we have already indicated, the 
classification decision itself does not establish and does not directly impact 
upon terms and conditions of employment and hence does not fall within the ambit 
of an employee organization's negotiation rights, it cannot be said to diminish 
those rights. Thus, the Judiciary Law does not conflict with the Taylor Law 
principle that a classification decision is a nonmandatory subject of negoti-
ation. 
We now turn to the specific demands by which the Association seeks to 
negotiate various aspects of job classification: 
Demands IV, XV(N), XVI(A), XVI:(C), XVI(D), XVII and XVIII, all explicitly 
seek to negotiate the employer's decision to classify or reclassify employees, 
and hence are not mandatory subjects of negotiation. Demands 111(3) and XIV, 
while couched in terms of "impact", are also nonmandatory subjects of negoti-
ation. We treat with each of these more specifically: 
In Demand IV, the Association seeks to negotiate any decision to reclassify 
or alter job titles, or to create new titles, which would impact upon the 
Association's unchallenged representation status. This clearly is not a demand 
seeking to relieve adverse impact under Taylor Law principles, but rather one 
which seeks to negotiate the classification plan itself. 
Similarly, in Demand XV(N), the Association seeks to negotiate any reclas-
sification decision or any decision to create new positions which adversely 
impacts upon union membership or dues deductions. The decision, and not its 
Taylor Law impact, is the real subject of the negotiation demand. Moreover, 
6_ The full text of the Association demands or parts thereof which are in 
dispute may be found in the Appendix to this decision. 
" 5863 
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the subject matter of this demand, i.e., union membership, would not in any 
event be a term or condition of employment. 
In Demand XVI(A), the Association seeks a right of prior approval regarding 
any initial title classification, and seeks to negotiate any classification 
decision which impacts upon employee workload or level of responsibility. 
Again, the Association is seeking a direct role in the nonmandatory decisional 
process. 
Demands XVI(C) and XVI(D) seek to negotiate inter alia, any future classi-
fications, and any classifications which impact upon salaries. The fact that 
these demands also seek negotiations concerning matters other than classifica-
tion does not preserve any part of either demand as a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. As we held in Haverstraw, 11 PERB 1(3109 (1978), where a demand 
containing a nonmandatory element is presented in a unitary, inseparable 
fashion, the entire demand must be deemed nonmandatory. 
In Demand XVII, the Association seeks to negotiate classification deci-
sions which may adversely impact upon employer payments to the Association 
welfare fund. The demand is not limited to negotiations regarding methods of 
relieving any adverse impact or compensating employees therefor, but rather 
is one to negotiate the classification decision itself. 
In Demand XVIII, the Association seeks to negotiate classification deci-
sions which may adversely impact upon its status as exclusive negotiating 
representative for "covered employees" in certain retirement systems. This 
demand is essentially the same as Demand IV, and similarly is a nonmandatory 
subject of negotiation. 
In Demand 111(3), the Association seeks to negotiate the "effect" of 
reclassification or of the creation of new positions upon union membership or 
dues deductions. Inasmuch as the "effect" is to be "handled in accordance with 
the provisions of paragraph N of Demand XV", supra, it requires negotiation of 
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the classification decision itself, rather than its impact on terms and condi-
tions of employment. In any event, even if this were clearly an impact demand, 
the subject matter of said demand, i.e. union membership, is not a term and 
condition of employment, and hence, a negotiating obligation would not attach. 
Finally, in Demand XIV, the Association seeks a guarantee that certain 
existing promotional lines will remain unchanged in the event of a reclassifi-
cation and, alternatively, seeks to negotiate the impact of reclassification 
upon such promotional lines. Since the demand would mandate negotiations 
regarding the criteria or qualifications for promotion, which is a matter of 
managerial prerogative, it is a nonmandatory subject, Onondaga Community College 
supra; West Irondequoit Bd. of Ed., supra. 
Allocation 
jQb.:.allQ!cationlisea;:pro.cesscby::which each of :the positionsy once classified, 
is assigned to one or another of the 38 salary grades specified in §37 of the 
Judiciary Law. Each of the salary grades has a minimum annual salary, a maxi-
mum annual salary, and three intermediate steps. Movement from step to step 
occurs annually and is automatic. Many positions with different classifica-
tions may be allocated to the same salary grade. Thus, for example, positions 
classified separately as senior court officer and assistant court clerk, 
allocated to salary grade 16, would have the same minimum and maximum salaries 
and the same intermediate salary progression steps. 
OCA contends that job allocation is part of the classification process. 
According to OCA, its duty to negotiate wages and salaries includes the duty 
to negotiate the minimum and maximum salaries for each salary grade as well as 
the annual increments, once it has assigned positions to salary grades. It would 
not, however, include the allocation of any position to any salary grade. Thus, 
the employee organizations would be limited to negotiating a single salary 
scale for the diverse occupations that OCA would unilaterally decide should be 
Board- U-3714/U-3767 -9 
allocated to the same grade. 
The Association asserts that the allocation of job classifications to 
salary grades is an aspect of wage determination which, pursuant to public 
policy and the Taylor Law, is a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
We agree with the Association that the duty to negotiate wages and salaries 
as specified in the Taylor Law extends to the negotiation of the salary grades 
of each occupational classification. Otherwise, the Association would be; •. 
foreclosed from the exercise of the full scope of its negotiation rights under 
the Taylor Law. Hence, absent a clear legislative intent to the contrary or' 
unusual policy considerations, salary grade allocation is a mandatory subject 
of negotiation, City of New Rochelle, 7 PERB 1(4505, affirmed 7 PERB K 3021 
(1974). 
There is such a clear contrary legislative intent with respect to employees 
of the Executive Branch of the State, whose jobs are allocated.to grade by the 
independent Director of Classification and Compensation pursuant to Article 8 
2 . . •• . 
of the Civil Service Law. OCA contends that this legislative intent is appli-
cable to employees of the Judicial Branch of government as well as to those of 
the Executive Branch. We disagree. The Legislative Committee report preceding 
the enactment of the legislation applicable to the Executive Branch reveals 
that the Legislature removed allocation from the negotiating table in reliance 
upon the mechanism it established under Article 8 of the Civil Service Law 
which brought all allocation decisions and employee appeals therefrom within 
2 This legislative intent was specified in L. 1970, ch. 158, §24. In relevant 
part it states: 
"...the legislature finds and declares that allocations and realloca-
tions to salary grades of positions in the classified service of the 
state are not terms and conditions of employment under article fourteen 
of the civil service law. The legislature further finds and declares 
that such allocations and reallocations are not within the scope of a 
fact-finding board but are to be accomplished exclusively pursuant to 
the provisions of article eight of the civil service law." 
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the purview of an independent Director of Classification and Compensation and 
8 
State Civil Service Commission. Nonjudicial employees are not covered by and 
have no recourse to Article 8 of the Civil Service Law. Rather, matters of 
classification and allocation of nonjudicial employees are within the domain of 
the Chief Administrator of the Courts and OCA (as delegated by the Chief Judge 
1 
of the Court of Appeals), i.e., the employer herein. OCA contends that the 
procedures contained in its proposed classification plan for determination of 
allocations and appeals are no less comprehensive than those contained in CSL 
Article 8 for Executive Branch employees. A self-imposed procedure, however, 
stands in significant contrast to one which is legislatively mandated. 
OCA also attributes to the Legislature a direct intent to exclude alloca-
tion from the scope of negotiation in Judiciary Law §39.8(a). With respect to 
allocation, that section reads as follows: 
"...The administrative board in accordance with section two hundred 
nineteen of this article shall determine, retroactive to April first, 
nineteen hundred seventy-seven, the salary grade of each employee who 
becomes an employee of the state of New York pursuant to this section; 
provided, however, nothing herein contained shall be deemed to diminish: 
(i) the right of any employee organization to negotiate wages or. . 
salaries pursuant to article fourteen of the civil service law, or: 
(ii) the right of any employee to receive wages or salaries pursuant 
to subdivision six of this section." 
8^  A select joint legislative committee report states, in relevant part: 
"Article 8 of the Civil Service Law sets out carefully the detailed 
procedure for insuring that job titles in the Civil Service system 
are allocated appropriately to salary grade positions, taking into 
consideration all relevant circumstances which bear upon job evalua-
tion. This system is intended to be administered by the Director of 
Classification and Compensation impartially and without undue pressures 
of competing interests, in order to insure that such job title-salary 
relationships shall be fair and equitable. In our view, it was not 
the intention of the Legislature in adopting Article 14 of the Civil 
Service Law to abrogate in any fashion the exclusive responsibility 
of the Director in this area....In this particular instance...the long-
standing special procedure provided by Article 8 of the Civil Service 
Law requires us to conclude that this matter of salary grade allocation 
must be decided by the Director of Classification and Compensation...." 
9_ See Corkum v. Bartlett, 46 NY2d 424 (1979); N.Y.S. Const. Art. VI, §28; 
Judiciary Law §§39.8(a) and 211.1(d). 
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The Association argues that the two provisos at the end of §39.8(a) mandate 
that allocation be subjected to the negotiations process. We agree with the 
Association. The language of §24 of Chapter 158 of the Laws of 1970, applic-
able to the Executive Branch, discussed above, plainly manifests that when the 
Legislature seeks to remove a matter from the negotiating table, it does so in 
no uncertain terms. No comparable language can be found in Judiciary Law 
§39.8(a), nor anywhere else in the Judiciary Law. To the contrary, Judiciary 
10. ' . ' . 
Law §39.6(a) together with the second proviso in §39.8(a), continues the 
right of nonjudicial employees to receive existing benefits until altered by 
state law or successor contract, and the first proviso to §39.8(a) preserves the 
right of employee organizations to negotiate wages and salaries under the 
Taylor Law in their behalf. If the initial clause of §39.8(a) were to be read 
as barring the negotiation of allocation decisions, the rights afforded by the 
two provisos and by §39.6(a) would be severely eroded. Nothing suggests that 
such was the Legislature's intent. Consequently, we view the initial clause of 
§39.8(a) simply as enabling language which confers the power to make allocation 
decisions upon the administrative board, but which does not preclude the nego-
tiation of such decisions with employee organizations representing court 
employees. 
OCA also makes a.public policy argument that allocation be excluded from 
the scope of negotiations. It would have us conclude that the avoidance of a 
highly complex pay structure for its employees is a public policy consideration 
sufficiently significant to excuse it from the negotiation of job allocation. 
10 In relevant part this statute provides that nonjudicial employees who 
become state employees pursuant to the act: 
"shall be entitled to the salaries, wages, hours and other terms 
and conditions of employment to which they were entitled pursuant 
to any law or contract in effect immediately prior to the effective 
date hereof...until altered by state law or by the terms of a successor 
contract...." 
: 5868 
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It argues that, if it were required to negotiate allocation decisions with each 
of the organizations representing 42 different negotiating units, it would be 
unable to develop a rational personnel structure because the organizations all 
have adverse competing interests, each seeking to maximize benefits for its own 
membership. This argument is one of administrative convenience and not of 
public policy relating to governmental mission. As such, it cannot outweigh 
the significance of the essential wage characteristics of allocation decisions. 
The language of the Judiciary Law supports this conclusion. 
In enacting Judiciary Law §39.7, the Legislature specifically preserved a 
labor relations structure by which nonjudicial employees are represented in 
diverse negotiating units. Under that statute, PERB is precluded from altering 
any established negotiating unit comprised exclusively of court employees or 
that part of any other negotiating unit comprised of such employees. Had the 
Legislature intended to avoid the results claimed by OCA, it could have placed 
all nonjudicial employees in a single negotiating unit to be represented by a 
single employee organization. By choosing instead to perpetuate the existing 
structure, the Legislature plainly implied that it did not share OCA's adminis-
trative convenience concerns. 
Having determined that the Judiciary Law does not upset, but in fact sup-
ports, our Taylor Law analysis, we now look at the two Association demands 
seeking negotiations as to allocation. Demand XI seeks the assurance that 
implementation of "slotting", i.e., allocation of positions to salary grades, 
shall have no adverse impact upon employees who are promoted. In effect, this 
is a demand seeking to negotiate pay ranges and schedules to be applied to 
employees upon promotion, so as to prevent any monetary loss. In Demand XVI(B), 
the Association seeks assurances regarding the salary ranges to which positions 
will be allocated under specified conditions, and as to allocation within a 
salary range. In accordance with our foregoing discussion, these demands in-
volve mandatory subjects of negotiation, and the employer is obligated to nego-
Board - U-3714/U-3767 -13 
tiate with the Association in their regard. 
THE REMAINING DEMANDS 
Wages 
The employer has refused to negotiate two demands relating to wages. In 
Demand VI, the Association seeks to negotiate as to the time when salary incre-
ments will be paid. In Demand XII(B), the Association seeks to negotiate pay 
differentials in the event that reclassification or reallocation alters employee 
workload or responsibilities. These demands relate directly to wages, and are 
mandatory subjects of negotiation (CSL §204.3). 
In Demand VI, the Association also seeks legislative amendment of Judiciary 
Law provisions to reflect negotiated changes in the salary schedule. While the 
content of legislation is generally not within the scope of negotiations, in 
Rochester Fire Fighters Local 1071, 12 PERB 1(3047 (1979), we held that legisla-
tion "becomes a matter of concern under the Taylor Law when it is necessary 
'for the implementation of terms of a collective agreement (CSL §204-a)". The 
instant demand merely seeks employer support in obtaining requisite implementing 
legislation, and therefore is a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
Job Assignment 
In Demand XXVII(F), the Association seeks to negotiate the impact of the 
classification plan "upon assignments, reassignments and transfers". In Demand 
XXVIII, it seeks an assurance that employees will not be assigned "out-of-title 
work". Both demands relate to the deployment of staff, which this Board has 
held to be a management prerogative and, hence, a nonmandatory subject of nego-
tiation, Orange Co. Comm. Coll. Faculty Assn., 9 PERB 1[3068 (1976); City of 
w 
White Plains, 5 PERB 1(3008 (1972). Administrative remedies may be available 
11 In the private sector, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that an 
employer did not discriminate against employees whose assignments it 
changed, stated that "an employer has a fundamental right to assign 
employees to positions the employer deems, in the exercise of its mana-
gerial discretion, most expedient", Macy's v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 835, 839, 
67 LRRM 2563, 2565 (1968). 
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in the event of an assignment to "out-of-title" work". In the collective bar-
gaining context, however, though a union may seek negotiations for extra com-
pensation for out-of-title assignments, it may not insist upon negotiations 
12 
regarding the decision to make such assignments. 
Job Qualifications 
In Demand XXXI(K), the Association seeks to preserve existing promotional 
lists for a period of four years from the date of implementation of the classi-
fication plan, and alternatively, seeks negotiations regarding which existing 
lists are appropriate for newly created, altered, or converted titles. The 
negotiation of promotional lists impinges upon an employer's right unilaterally 
to determine qualifications for promotion. Consequently, the demand is not a 
mandatory subject of negotiation, West Irondequoit Bd. of Ed., supra. 
Court Consolidation and Reorganization 
In Demand XXV(J), the Association seeks a guarantee that any court con-
solidation or reorganization which affects nonjudicial employees "be implemented 
through a procedure to be adopted by the parties". The organizational structure 
of a public employer is not a mandatory subject of negotiation, Scarsdale, 
8 PERB 113075 (1975). 
Grievances 
In Demand XXIX, the Association seeks to establish a specified grievance 
procedure. The procedure for resolving grievances concerning terms and con-
ditions of employment is, of course, a mandatory subject of negotiation. In 
the instant demand, however, the Association extends the grievance procedure to 
encompass matters which are nonmandatory subjects of negotiation, such as dis-
12 Compare West Irondequoit Teachers v. Helsby, 35 NY2d 46 (1974) in which 
the Court held that teachers could seek negotiations for varying com-
pensation depending upon the size of the classes to which they are 
assigned, but they may not insist upon negotiations regarding the 
decision to make such assignments. 
U&tl 
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putes concerning improper job classification and injuries inflicted by other 
employee groups, unions or associations. While the demand does include matters 
which are properly subject to the grievance procedure, the Association has not 
indicated that it intends the list of grievable subjects to be treated as 
separable. Accordingly, we address the list as unitary, and find the entire 
demand to be a nonmandatory subject of negotiation, Haverstraw, supra; Pearl 
River U.F.S.D., 11 PERB 1(3085 (1978). 
Labor Management Committees 
In Demand XXX, the Association seeks to establish a labor-management 
committee to make binding recommendations concerning employee working conditions 
and "all other matters of mutual concern". Inasmuch as the committee could be 
given final jurisdiction over matters which are themselves nonmandatory subjects 
of negotiation, the demand is nonmandatory, Pearl River, supra. 
Peace Officer Status 
In Demand XXI(A), the Association seeks legislation to maintain the 
peace officer status of aiy employee who, by reason of reclassification, experi-
ences a change in job title. The conferring of peace officer status is a matter 
of legislative policy and is not a term or condition of employment. The legis-
lation sought by the Association here is not of the type contemplated by CSL 
§204-a for the implementation of the terms of a collective agreement. This 
demand is not a mandatory subject of negotiation, Rochester Fire Fighters Local 
1071, supra. 
NOW, THEREFORE, 
1. In Case No. U-3714, WE ORDER the employer to negotiate in good 
faith with respect to those portions of Demands VI, XI, XII(B), 
and XVI(B) as are appended hereto. In all other respects, the 
charge is dismissed. 
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2. In Case No. U-3767, WE ORDER the Association to cease insisting 
upon the negotiation of those portions of Demands 111(3), IV, XIV, 
XV(N), XVIXA), XVI(C), XVI(D), XVII, XVIII, XXV(j), XXVII(F), 
XXVIII, XXTX, XXX, XXXI(A) and XXXI (K) as are appended hereto. 
In all other respects, the charge is dismissed. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
August 15, 1979 
Wz^+^e. /R4*4 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Jfe4»u /C^t^c<^— 
Ida Klaus, Member 
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A P P E N D I X 
The following are the demands of the Association that are under chal-
lenge. They are listed in numerical order in accordance with the numbers 
assigned by the Association. 
DEMAND III: UNION RECOGNITION AND UNIT DESIGNATION 
(3) any effect such reclassification or creation of new positions may 
have upon union membership and dues deductions shall be handled in accordance 
with the provisions of paragraph N of Demand XV. 
DEMAND IV: UNCHALLENGED REPRESENTATION 
Pursuant to Section 208 of the Civil Service Law, the Union shall have 
unchallenged representation status for the maximum period permitted by Law on 
the date of execution of this Agreement. Any decision of the Employer to 
reclassify, alter or convert present job titles specified in this Agreement, 
or to create new job positions performing similar, work, which has an impact 
upon the Union's unchallenged representation status, shall be negotiated with 
the Union. 
DEMAND VI: EMPLOYER'S OBLIGATION UNDER 'CHAPTER 966 
The Employer and the Union recognize that i t is the Employer's obliga-
tion to adopt a classification structure for each employee covered herein pur-
suant to Section 8 (A) of the State Takeover Bill and it is further recognized 
that it is the Employer's obligation to establish a salary grade for each 
employee covered herein in conformance with Section 8 (B) of the above cited 
Law and in accordance with Section 219 of the Judiciary Law. 
05»Ht 
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Both parties agree that Section 219 contains a salary grade schedule 
calling for a 5-step minimum to maximum pay plan with four equal annual incre-
ment steps between the minimum and maximum of the grade. In addition, there 
are two longevity steps above the maximum of the grade. 
Each increment step takes effect on the first day of each Fiscal Year 
(April 1st) following the completion of at least twelve payroll periods in 
title in the previous year. 
The first longevity step is payable on the first day of the Fiscal Year 
(April 1st) following the completion of five years at the maximum of the 
employee's pay grade. 
The second longevity step is payable on the first day of the Fiscal Year 
(April 1st) following the completion of ten years at the maximum of the 
employee's pay grade. 
The Employer shall follow the above format when the slotting of all 
covered employees is accomplished under existing law, and said Section 219 
shall be amended to reflect all salary raises, salary ranges, increments, and 
increases and any other terms and conditions of employment provided herein. 
DEMAND XI: ADVANCEMENT INCREASES 
The Employer agrees that the implementation of slotting under Judiciary 
Law, Sections 219., 220, shall have no adverse impact upon employees promoted or 
advanced to a title covered by this Agreement. 
(The rest of the demand is not in dispute.) 
DEMAND XII: PAY DIFFERENTIALS 
(B) To the extent that any classification, reclassification, allocation 
or reallocation has an impact upon the volume of work or level of responsi-
bility of employees covered by this Agreement, any and all such employees shall 
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receive a pay differential which shall be negotiated with the Union and shall 
be computed upon base salaries and deemed part of wages and compensation for 
all purposes. 
DEMAND XIV: LINES OF PROMOTION 
The Employer and the Union agree that should a subsequent reclassifica-
tion alter or convert the present job titles specified in the unit designation 
herein or create new titles performing essentially similar work, the lines of 
promotion listed below shall remain unchanged. In any event, the impact of• 
such subsequent reclassification upon the existing lines of promotion listed 
below shall be negotiated with the Union. Both parties recognize the following 
to be the existing promotion lines: 
Uniformed Court Officer - promotes to Senior Court Officer 
or to Assistant Court Clerk. 
Senior Court Officer - lines can only be filled by a 
promoted Uniformed Court Officer. 
SCO's promote to Court Clerk I or 
Supervising Court Officer. 
Assistant Court Clerk - lines can only be filled by a pro-
moted Uniformed Court Officer or an 
SCO by lateral, transfer. ACC pro-
motes to Court Clerk I or Surrogate's 
Court Clerk I. 
Court Clerk I - lines can only be filled by a pro-
moted Senior Court Officer or 
Assistant Court Clerk. CCI promotes 
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to Court Clerk II or to Surrogate's 
Court Clerk II. 
Court Clerk II - lines can only be filled by a pro-
moted Court Clerk I, CC II pro-
motes to Court Clerk III or to 
Surrogate's Court Clerk III. 
* Court Clerk III - lines can only be filled by a 
promoted Court Clerk II. CC III 
promotes to Court Clerk IV. 
* Court Clerk IV - lines can only be filled by a 
promoted Court Clerk III. 
* Does not apply to incumbent Court Clerk III and Court Clerk IV and will 
take effect upon ratification of this agreement. 
All.promotions from Uniformed Court Officer to Court Clerk IV shall be 
by competitive promotional examination only. 
DEMAND XV: UNION RIGHTS AND DUES DEDUCTION 
(N) Any decision of the Employer to reclassify, alter, or convert 
Present Job Titles specified in this Agreement, or to create new job positions 
performing similar work, which has an impact upon Union membership and dues 
deductions, shall be negotiated with the Union. 
DEMAND XVI: CLASSIFICATION AND ALLOCATION 
(A) C las si fi ca tl on: • 
1. No title shall be initially classified by the Employer 
without prior approval of the Union. 
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2. Any classification which has an impact upon the volume 
of work and/or level of responsibility of any employees covered by this 
Agreement shall be negotiated with the Union. 
(B) Allocation: 
1. Upon initial allocation to State pay grades there shall 
be no "red-circling"; specifically, (a) each existing title shall be allocated 
to a salary grade which has a maximum rate which encompasses the highest rate 
in the title established under the salary rang.es proposed in Demand VII, and 
(b) if two or more existing titles are combined into a single t i t l e , the single 
title shall be allocated to a salary grade which has a maximum rate which 
encompasses the highest rate in the highest salaried existing title established 
under the salary ranges proposed in Demand VII. 
2. An employee's annual increment step shall be determined 
by his years of service in title prior to allocation or by his salary prior to 
allocation, whichever would produce the higher incremental step. Upon alloca-
tion, no employee shall be paid a salary rate which falls between annual incre-
ment steps; rather, an employee shall be raised to the next higher annual incre-
ment step above his pre-allocation salary. 
(C) Reclassification/Reallocation: Any future reclassification 
and/or reallocation shall be the subject of collective bargaining. This pro-
vision shall survive the expiration of this Agreement. 
(D) Any classification, reclassification, allocation, or realloca-
tion, which has an impact upon salary ranges, salary raises, increments, or 
increases shall be negotiated with the Union. 
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DEMAND XVII: WELFARE FUNDS 
Any decision, of the Employer to reclassify, alter or convert present 
Job Titles specified in this Agreement, or to create new job positions per-
forming similar work, which has an impact upon Employer payments to the Welfare 
Funds referred to in this Demand, shall be negotiated with the Union. 
DEMAND XVIII: PENSIONS 
Any decision of the Employer to reclassify, alter or convert present 
Job Titles specified in this Agreement, or to create new job positions per-
forming similar work, which has an impact upon the Union's status as the sole 
and exclusive bargaining representative for covered employees included in the 
New York City Employees Retirement System and the New York State Retirement 
System shall be negotiated with the Union. 
DEMAND XXV: CIVIL SERVICE, CAREER DEVELOPMENT AND JOB SECURITY 
(J) Any court consolidation or reorganization to the extent that it 
effects non-judicial employees, shall be implemented through a procedure to be 
adopted by the parties. 
•DEMAND XXVII: TRANSFERS 
(F) The impact of the Employer's statewide classification system upon 
assignments, reassignments and transfers shall be the subject of negotiation 
with the Union. 
DEMAND XXVIII: OUT-OF-TITLE WORK 
No person shall be assigned to perform the duties of any position unless 
he has been duly appointed, promoted, or reinstated to such position in accor-
dance with the provisions of the Rules of the Administrative Board of the 
Judicial Conference. 
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DEMAND XXIX: GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE 
(A) The term "grievance" shall mean: 
1. A dispute concerning the application or interpretation of the 
terms of this collective bargaining Agreement. 
2. A{dispute concerning improper classification of job position or 
improper allocation to salary grade. 
3. A claimed violation, misinterpretation or misapplication of the 
rules or regulations, policy or orders of the Employer affecting any terms and 
conditions of employment. 
4. A violation of any past practice involving the labor-management 
relationship of the parties. 
5. A claimed assignment of employees to out of title work or duties 
different from those stated in their job specifications. 
6. A claimed arbitrary or capricious act affecting the terms and 
conditions of employment. 
7. A claimed improper holding of an open competitive rather than a 
promotional examination. 
8. A claimed wrongful disciplinary action against an employee. 
9. A condition of employment which adversely affects the health 
and safety of employees. 
10. A claimed discriminatory supervisory practice. 
11. A claimed injury or discrimination inflicted by other employee 
groups, unions or associations. 
12. A claimed unreasonable work assignment or condition. 
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13. Any other dispute which the two parties agree can best be 
settled by submission to the grievance procedure. 
(Ihe language of the rest of the demand occasions no dispute.) 
DEMAND XXX: LABOR MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE 
To facilitate communication between the Employer and the Union and to 
enhance constructive employee relations a Labor-Management Committee shall be 
established effective 4/1/77. 
The Committee shall act on a City-wide basis covering each title in this 
negotiating unit and every Court and Court agency in which the Union has mem-
bership. 
The Committee shall consider and recommend changes in the working con-
ditions of the employees covered by this Agreement and all other matters of 
mutual concern including those subject to the grievance procedure. Such 
recommendations shall be binding upon the Employer. 
(The rest of the demand is not in dispute.) 
DEMAND XXXI: ' MISCELLANEOUS 
(A) If any classification or reclassification results in a change in 
title for any covered employee who is now a peace officer, the Employer shall 
report such change to the State legislature and the Governor and shall submit 
legislation for the continuation of these newly converted titles in section 
1.20 of the Criminal Procedure Law. 
(K) Should a subsequent reclassification alter or convert any job title 
specified in Demand III or create a new job title performing essentially 
similar work, no then-existing promotion list shall be terminated as a result 
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of said reclassification and no such list shall be terminated for any reason 
until four years from the date of its implementation. 
Upon the implementation of any reclassification, the Employer shall 
enter into negotiations with the Union for the purpose of resolving the ques-
tion of which existing lists may be made appropriate for any of the created, 
altered or converted titles, in addition to the original titles. 
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BACKGROUND 
In 1976, Congress required each State to cover employees of 
1 
local government under its unemployment insurance program. How-
ever, it authorized states to withhold unemployment insurance 
benefits from employees of educational institutions whose unem-
ployment is during a school vacation if there is a reasonable 
assurance that the unemployed individual will be returned to 
2 
employment at the conclusion of the vacation. New York State has 
1 Public Law 94-566, amending the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 
Title 26, USC, Chapter 23. 
2 26 USC, §3304 (a) (6) (A)ii provides, in pertinent part that at 
the option of a state, unemployment insurance 
"may be denied to any individual for any week which 
commences during a period between two successive 
academic years or terms if such individual performs 
such services in the first of such academic years or 
terms and there is a reasonable assurance that such 
individual will perform such services in the second 
of such academic years or terms...." 
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enacted legislation providing such an exclusion from unemployment 
insurance benefits. In the case of teaching personnel, the exclu-
sionary language is a close paraphrase of the wording of the 
Federal statute. However, Labor Law §590.11, which applies to 
non-professional employees, is significantly different. By its 
terms, such an unemployment insurance claimant who is not in a 
bargaining unit is disqualified for benefits during a vacation 
period if he has "an individual contract to perform services" for 
the academic year following the vacation. A claimant who is a 
member of a collective bargaining unit will be disqualified if he 
"has a written contract which continues his services" for the 
3 
following academic year. On April 25, 1978, the Labor Department 
" 4 
issued a Special Bulletin interpreting §590.11. Its interpreta-
3_ In pertinent part, Labor Law §590.11 reads: 
"11. Benefits based on non-professional employment with cer-
tain educational institutions. If a claimant was employed in 
other than an instructional, research or principal adminis-
trative capacity by an educational institution which is not 
an institution of higher education, the following shall apply 
to any week commencing during the period between two succes-
sive academic years .or terms provided the claimant as a member 
of a collective bargaining unit has a written contract which 
continues his services in such capacity for any such institu-
tion or institutions for both of such academic years or terms 
or an individual contract to perform services for such period 
if he is not a member of a bargaining unit; and, during the 
period of any such contract, to any week commencing during an 
established and customary vacation period or holiday recess, 
not between such academic terms or years, provided the claimanl 
performed services for such institution immediately before 
such vacation period or holiday recess and the claimant has a 
contract, as above, that continues his or her services for the 
period immediately following such vacation period or holiday 
recess;" 
4 Special Bulletin A-710-53. 
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tion is that a claimant who is a member of a collective bargaining 
unit having a collective bargaining agreement may be denied bene-
fits during the vacation period even though the collective agree-
ment does not guarantee his continued employment if 
"he has an individual notice, letter or document contain-
ing such guarantee, provided such instruments are not 
expressly prohibited by the terms of the collective bar-
gaining agreement." 
It further provides that the claimant may be denied benefits if he 
"is a member of a collective bargaining unit having no 
collective bargaining agreement or having an expired 
agreement, but he has an individual notice, letter or 
document containing a guarantee of his continued 
employment;" 
During June 1978, several school districts unilaterally 
issued written notices to non-teaching employees that they were 
guaranteed employment for the academic year following the 19 78 
summer vacation. This conduct has given rise to two parallel 
groups of proceedings. 
Claimants for unemployment insurance who received those 
notices were disqualified by the Labor Department. On December 8, 
1978, the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board affirmed those dis-
qualifications. The correctness of the posture of the Labor 
Department has been brought before the Appellate Division and is 
awaiting resolution. The critical issue in those cases will prob-
ably focus on the Labor Department's interpretation of §590.11 and 
the question whether anything less than a collective agreement 
guaranteeing continuing employment is sufficient to disqualify a 
claimant who is in a bargaining unit from unemployment insurance 
benefits. 
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FACTS 
The cases herein are part of the second group of proceed-
ings . They are before this Board on charges that are made by five 
employee organizations which represent employees of four school 
districts who received notices that their employment will be con-
tinued after the 19 78 summer recess. 
At the time when the notices were issued by the four school 
districts that are the respondents herein, the Spencerport Central 
School District was a party to collectively negotiated agreements 
with the Spencerport Transportation Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-
CIO, and with the Spencerport Civil Service Office Personnel Asso-
ciation, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, the charging parties in Cases U-3433 
and U-34 34, respectively. The Galway Central School District was 
then a party to a collectively negotiated agreement with the Galway 
Unit of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, the charging party in U-3475. The Greater 
Amsterdam School District was then engaged in collective negotia-
tions with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 100 0, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, charging party in U-3477, for an agreement to 
succeed a prior agreement between them. The Northeastern Clinton 
School District was then engaged in collective negotiations with 
the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 10 00, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, charging party in U-3476, for an agreement to succeed a 
prior agreement between them. 
The June 1978 notices issued by the four school districts 
did not purport to set terms and conditions of employment. In 
Spencerport and Galway, the terms and conditions of employment would 
be as specified in the current collective agreements, and in Greate:: 
Amsterdam and Northeastern Clinton, they would be as eventually 
specified in the agreements being negotiated collectively. The 
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notices issued by the four school districts all requested the re-
cipient employees to acknowledge receipt of the notice and the 
Spencerport and Galway notices also requested the recipient 
employees to indicate whether they accepted the employment that 
was being offered to them. During the negotiations involving the 
employer in Northeastern Clinton, the employee organization had 
made a demand for a guarantee of job security. The employer did 
not agree to negotiate this demand. 
The five above-captioned cases all present a common ques-
tion: Is it an improper practice for a school district to issue 
to some of its non-teaching employees notices that their services 
will be continued for the following year? The charges allege that 
the employers' conduct constituted a refusal to negotiate in good 
faith, in violation of CSL §209-a.l(d) and an interference with 
employees for the purpose of depriving them of their organiza-
tional rights, in violation of CSL §209-a.l(a). In a consolidated 
decision, a hearing officer determined that the employers in Cases 
U-3433, U-3434, U-3475 and U-34 77 violated neither. In a separate 
decision, he exonerated-the employer in Case No. U-3476. The 
charging parties in all of the cases have filed exceptions and we 
have consolidated them for decision. The basis of his decisions 
is that the unilateral issuance of individual notices did not 
constitute a violation by any of the four employers of its duty to 
negotiate in good faith (CSL §209-a.l[d]) because the granting or 
withholding of ah assurance of continued employment is not a man-
datory subject of negotiation. He also determined that the uni-
lateral issuance of notices did not constitute interference with 
employees for the purpose of depriving them of their organiza-
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tional rights (CSL §209-a.l[a]) because the employers' conduct 
was neither motivated by a design to deprive employees of their 
organizational rights nor was it inherently destructive of those 
rights. 
DISCUSSION 
The first question raised by the exceptions of the charging 
parties is: does the language of Labor Law §590.11 reflect a 
legislative intention that assurances of continued employment for 
non-teaching employees of school districts be a mandatory subject 
of negotiation? The second question raised by the exceptions 
derives from an alternative argument of the charging parties: even 
if an assurance of continued employment for ten-month non-teaching 
employees of school districts is not a mandatory subject of nego-
tiation, does a school district, nevertheless, interfere with the 
organizational rights of these employees when it makes commitments 
to them regarding such continued employment? 
The Alleged Refusal to Negotiate 
There is no dispute that the normal rule is that a guar-
antee of continued employment is not a mandatory subject of nego-
tiation. It is equally clear that such a guarantee is a subject 
about which a public employer could negotiate collectively and 
that the public employer could be bound by the terms of a collec-
I 
tive agreement on this subject. Charging parties assert, however, 
5 8 8 9 5 In Burke v. Bowen, 40 NY2d 264 (1976), the Court of Appeals 
said (at P.267): 
"While 'job security' is not a term or condition of employment 
subject to mandatory bargaining under the Taylor Law (Civil 
Service Law §204, subd. 2), "job security' for a reasonable 
period of time is a permissive subject for a public employer 
to negotiate, and to agree upon in a collective agreement." 
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that the enactment of Labor Law §590.11 reflects a legislative 
intention that there be a different rule when the effect of such 
a guarantee of continued employment would be to deprive non-
teaching employees of school districts of unemployment insurance 
benefits. Some support for this assertion can be found in the 
language of Labor Law §590.11, which refers to individual contracts 
guaranteeing continued employment to employees who are not in 
negotiating units while omitting the reference to individual con-
tracts in the case of employees who are in such units. The 
claimants argue that this language indicates that the legislature 
assumed and intended that, for employees in negotiating units, 
there would be collective negotiations on job security. 
We do not find this reasoning convincing. The legislature, in 
enacting Labor Law §590.11, must be deemed to have known of the 
prior rulings of the Court of Appeals that job security is a per-
missive, but not a mandatory, subject of negotiation. The inter-
pretation of Labor Law §590.11 urged upon us by the charging par-
ties would require a determination that the legislature amended 
the Taylor Law by implication, a statutory construction which is 
"not favored". . By way of contrast, when, in .1973, the legislature 
changed the scope of negotiations under the Taylor Law by amending 
the Retirement and Social Security Law, it made conforming amend-
7 
ments in the Taylor Law. We conclude that the reference in Labor 
6_ McKinney's Statutes §370. 
2 See L. 1973, ch. 382,. §§6 and 48, which amended CSL §201.4 and 
enacted Ret. & Soc. Sec. Law, Art. 12. 
!
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Law §590.11 to individual contracts for some, but not other, 
employees contemplated the result of permissive negotiations and 
not an expansion of the scope of mandatory negotiations. Thus, 
while the statutory language has significance for the resolution 
of questions presented to the Labor Department concerning disquali-' 
fication of non-teaching employees from unemployment insurance 
benefits, it has no bearing upon the questions before this Board. 
The Alleged Interference with Organizational Rights 
Unilateral action by a public employer concerning a matter 
that is not a mandatory subject of negotiation is nevertheless 
improper if the action is taken for the purpose of interfering 
with the organizational rights of public employees. This would be 
the case, for example, if an employer were to reassign an employee 
for the purpose of chilling organizational activities such as the 
preparation of negotiation demands, Cohoes City School District, 
12 PERB 113065 (1979). Sometimes the improper motivation may be 
presumed from the action itself if it is inherently destructive of 
the organizational rights of employees, State of New York, 10 PERB 
1(3108 (1977). Depending upon the extent of the harm that the 
action inflicts upon employees' organizational rights, the pre-
sumption may or may not be rebuttable by explanations offered by 
the employer to justify its conduct, NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 
338 US 26 (1967). That harm increases as a union representing or 
seeking to represent employees is made to appear ineffectual by an 
employer's conduct. 
The widespread commitment of job security to individual 
employees by the four employers, with the consequent disqualifi-
cation of the employees from unemployment insurance benefits may 
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be sufficient to impose upon the employers the burden of justi-
fying their actions because it could chill union support. That 
potential harm, however, is not sufficient to create an irrebut-
table presumption. The employers' conduct in unilaterally offer-
ing employees continued employment, a non-mandatory subject of 
negotiation, is not, in itself, wrongful. The Supreme Court has 
said: "in the sense of contracts of hiring, individual contracts 
between the employer and employee are not forbidden, but indeed 
are necessitated by the collective bargaining procedure.", J. I. 
Case v. NLRB, 321 US 332, 335-6 (1944). 
On the facts in these cases, the four employers have met 
the burden of explaining their actions as being motivated by 
legitimate business concerns and not by a design to interfere with 
the organizational rights of employees. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charges herein be, and 
they hereby are, dismissed. 
DATED: Albany,. .New Yorkr 
August 14, 1979 
Harold R. Newman*, Chairman 
David C. Randies, Member 
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DISSENTING OPINION OF IDA KLAUS 
For the reasons hereinafter stated, I would find a violation 
of §209-a.l(a) and (d) by all of the respondents. 
Section 590.11 of the Labor Law expresses a policy that non-
professional employees of educational institutions receive unemploy-
ment insurance benefits during summer 'and other recess periods for 
which they are not paid unless, prior to the recess, they are 
contractually guaranteed employment after the recess. In the case 
of employees who are in a collective bargaining unit, the statute 
permits disqualification for benefits only by means of a contract 
with the collective bargaining representative. Disqualification 
by means of a contract with the individual employee is permitted 
only where the individual is not a member of a collective 
bargaining unit. 
While we should not ordinarily interpret a statute that is 
enforceable by another agency, significant meaning must be 
attributed to the Legislature's use in this context of concepts 
peculiar to the Taylor Law. It would appear that, by providing that 
collective bargaining is the only means by which employees in 
bargaining units may be disqualified for unemployment insurance 
benefits, the Legislature has evinced an intention to bring this 
particular subject matter within the jurisdiction of this Board. 
I do not share the view of my colleagues that in the first 
exception expressed in §590.11 of the Labor Law, the Legislature 
meant no more than to acknowledge the permissive nature under the 
Taylor Law of job security provisions in collective bargaining 
5893 
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agreements. Normally, public employers rarely agree to include 
such provisions in collective agreements. It would, therefore, 
make little sense in this context for the Legislature to carve 
out an exception only for those few employers who would voluntarily 
accept such a demand in dealing with a collective bargaining 
representative. See City of Albany v. Robert D. Helsby, et al., 
4 8 AD2d 998 (3rd Dept., 1975), aff'd. on opinion of the App. Div., 
38 NY2d 778 (1975), for a similar approach to legislative 
construction. 
Looking at the language of §5 90.11 in the context of the 
Taylor Law, we must assume thatv by permitting disqualification 
through direct dealing with individual employees only in the 
absence of a collective bargaining representative, and permitting 
disqualification only through collective negotiations when there 
is a collective bargaining representative, the Legislature intended 
that the Taylor Law status of the collective bargaining representa-
tive not be undermined by bypassing it and dealing directly with 
individual employees in the unit. 
Hence, I conclude that, while the employers would normally 
have no obligation to negotiate the subject of job security, they 
may not, in the presence of a collective bargaining representative, 
deal directly with individual employees in order to disqualify 
them for unemployment insurance benefits. I therefore find that 
these employers violated §209-a.l(d) by communicating directly 
with the individual employees. 
I find in addition a violation of subsection (a). Whatever 
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their reasons may have been, the conduct of the employers in 
disregarding the collective bargaining representative and going 
directly to the individual employees was so inherently destructive 
of the employees' Taylor Law rights as to carry its own unlawful 
intent and motivation. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 US 221 
(1963); NLRB v. Great Dane. Trailers, 338 US 26 (19 67); State of 
New York, 10 PERB 1(3108. The answer to the finding of my 
colleagues that the employers were governed by a legitimate busi-
ness concern is that the Legislature specifically directed that 
that concern be dealt with through negotiation. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
August 15, 19 79 
cJtiL X%*UsiA— 
I d a K l a u s , Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of : 
. #2C - 8/15/79 
STATE OF NEW YORK (STATE UNIVERSITY : 
OF NEW YORK), : 
Employer, : BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
-and- : 
: CASE NO. C-1751 
COMMITTEE OF INTERNS AND RESIDENTS, : 
Petitioner, : 
-and- : 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, INC., : 
Intervenor. : 
JOSEPH M. BRESS, ESQ., (JOSEPH P. MARTINICO, ESQ., 
of Counsel) for Employer 
IRWIN GELLER, ESQ., for Petitioner 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ., for Intervenor 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Committee 
of Interns and Residents (CIR) to the decision of the Director 
of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dis-
missing its petition for certification as the exclusive represen-
tative of medical and dental interns, residents and fellows 
(house staff officers) employed by the State of New York through-
out the State University system (employer). The Director's deci-
sion granted the motion of the employer made during the course of 
a hearing on the question whether there should be a separate 
negotiating unit for the house staff officers of the employer. 
Board - C-1751 -2 
The basis of the motion was that CIR could not be certified to 
represent public employees because it had struck against the New 
York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (Corporation), a public 
employer, on January 17, 1979 and that strike invalidated the 
"no-strike affirmation" which it had filed with its petition on 
August 31, 1978. 
The Director determined that CIR was responsible for a house 
staff officer strike against the Corporation, as alleged, and he 
granted the motion to dismiss the petition. In its exceptions, 
CIR contests the Director's conclusion that there was a strike. 
It further argues that, in any event, the Director's action was 
excessive when he dismissed the petition. 
The Strike 
CIR concedes that it is responsible for a job action taken 
by the house staff officers against the Corporation on January 17, 
1979. It argues, however, that the job action did not constitute 
a strike because it was neither for the purpose of improving any 
employee's terms and conditions of employment nor related to any 
other matters pertaining to the Taylor Law. According to CIR, the 
job action was a political protest against contemplated action by 
the Mayor of.the City of New York involving the closing of several 
hospitals. The underlying concern was medical care for residents 
of the City of New York; job security for house staff officers 
was not in issue. 
In support of its argument that its job action of January 17, 
1979 was not a strike, CIR cites the report of the Governor's 'Committee on 
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Public Employees whose recommendations were the basis of the 
Taylor Law. It proposed that a "purpose" clause be included in 
the statutory definition of a strike. The Legislature, however, 
did not do so. In Local 342, 2 PERB 1[3001, this Board said, 
"A work stoppage whether it be termed a strike, a 
demonstration or a protest, if it involves a concerted 
work stoppage as here, is within the terms of the 
statutory prohibition." 
The job action conducted by CIR on January 17, 1979, 
1 
constituted a violation of §210 of the Taylor Law. 
The: Consequences of the Strike 
The "no-strike affirmation" filed by CIR along with its 
petition is required by statute (CSL §208.3). That affirmation 
may not be a meaningless gesture. An employee organization which 
seeks certification under the Taylor Law must commit itself to 
adhere to the policies specified in that law — including a 
commitment not to strike. An affirmation that is not sincerely 
made abuses Taylor Law processes and requires the dismissal of 
the petition. Similarly, an employee organization which has given 
a sincere "no-strike affirmation" may become disqualified for 
certification if, subsequent to the affirmation, it indicates by 
word or by deed that it is no longer adhering to its earlier 
commitment. 
1 The corporation and its employees come under the jurisdiction 
of the New York City Collective Bargaining Law. Accordingly, 
this Board has no jurisdiction to consider whether CIR should 
lose its privilege of having its dues checked off by the 
Corporation by reason of the job action. 
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The job action conducted by CIR may indicate that the 
affirmation given only 4-1/2 months earlier was not sincere. 
Alternatively, it may be that during the interim CIR abandoned 
the posture represented by its affirmation. In either case, 
the decision to dismiss the petition would have to be affirmed. 
On the other hand, it may be that CIR can explain its conduct in 
a manner that would persuade us that its "no-strike affirmation" 
was sincerely given at first and continued thereafter to reflect 
the posture of the organization. The opinion of the Supreme 
Court (New York City Health and Hospitals Corp. v. CIR, NYLJ, P.l, 
Col. 5, July 16, 19 79, 12 PERB 117528) denying a motion of the 
Corporation that CIR be held in criminal contempt by reason of 
2 
its job action suggests that this may be a possibility. In Town 
of Huntington, 1 PERB 1(399.96 (1968), we permitted an employee 
organization to persuade us that its job action was consistent 
with its "no-strike affirmation." The same opportunity is ex-
tended to CIR. 
NOW, THEREFORE, we invite CIR to submit to us, within 20 days 
from this Order, affidavits and other documents in support of its 
assertion that its no-strike affirmation was and continues to be 
bona fide. After evaluating this material, we will determine 
2 CF Probation and Parole Officers Assn. 4 PERB 113065 (1971) . 
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whether or not to affirm the determination of the Director 
dismissing the petiiton. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
August 15, 1979 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
/<3U«^L— 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YC 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELAT...--NS BOARD 
I n t h e M a t t e r of 
TOWN OF CHEEKTOWAGA, 
Employer , 
- a n d -
TOWN OF CHEEKTOWAGA EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION, 
P e t i t i o n e r , 
- a n d -
AFSCME, COUNCIL 66, LOCAL 1026 , 
. _ ^ _ _ _ I n t e r v e n o r . • 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A r e p r e s e n t a t i o n p r o c e e d i n g h a v i n g b e e n c o n d u c t e d i n t h e 
a b o v e m a t t e r b y t h e P u b l i c E m p l o y m e n t R e l a t i o n s B o a r d i n a c c o r d -
a n c e w i t h t h e P u b l i c E m p l o y e e s ' F a i r E m p l o y m e n t A c t a n d t h e 
R u l e s o f P r o c e d u r e o f t h e B o a r d , a n d i t a p p e a r i n g t h a t a 
n e g o t i a t i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e h a s b e e n s e l e c t e d , 
P u r s u a n t t o t h e a u t h o r i t y v e s t e d i n t h e B o a r d b y t h e 
P u b l i c E m p l o y e e s ' F a i r E m p l o y m e n t A c t , 
I T I S HEREBY C E R T I F I E D t h a t 
TOWN OF CHEEKTOWAGA EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION 
h a s b e e n d e s i g n a t e d a n d s e l e c t e d b y a m a j o r i t y o f t h e e m p l o y e e s 
o f t h e a b o v e n a m e d p u b l i c e m p l o y e r , i n t h e u n i t a g r e e d u p o n b y 
t h e p a r t i e s a n d d e s c r i b e d b e l o w , a s t h e i r e x c l u s i v e r e p r e s e n t a -
t i v e f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f c o l l e c t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s a n d t h e s e t t l e -
m e n t , o f g r i e v a n c e s . 
U n i t : I n c l u d e d : A l l employees of t h e Town of Cheektowaga, i n c l u d i n g Dog 
Wardens , Sen io r Sewage Treatment P l a n t O p e r a t o r , and CETA employees . 
, E x c l u d e d : E l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s , members of t h e P o l i c e Depar tment , 
S u p e r v i s o r ' s S e c r e t a r y , Town A t t o r n e y , C l e r k s t o t h e Town J u s t i c e s , 
Town Eng inee r , F i s c a l O f f i c e r , H e a l t h O f f i c e r s , E x e c u t i v e D i r e c t o r 
of t h e Youth Board, A s s e s s o r s , Working Foremen, A s s i s t a n t Working 
Foremen, B u i l d i n g and Plumbing I n s p e c t o r , Members of t h e Boards and 
Commissions a p p o i n t e d by t h e Town Board, s e a s o n a l , temporary and p a r t -
t i m e employees , F i r s t Deputy Town C l e r k , Second Deputy Town C l e r k , 
Deputy R e c e i v e r of Taxes and Assessmen t s , Youth Board Program 
C o o r d i n a t o r , and Sen io r R e c r e a t i o n S u p e r v i s o r . . 
„ FURTHER, I T IS-ORDERED t h a t t h e a b o v e n a m e d p u b l i c 
e m p l o y e r s h a l l n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h . 
TOWN OF CHEEKTOWAGA EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION 
a n d e n t e r i n t o a w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t w i t h s u c h e m p l o y e e o r g a n i z a t i o n 
w i t h r e g a r d t o t e r m s a n d c o n d i t i o n s o f e m p l o y m e n t , a n d s h a l l 
n e g o t i a t e . c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h s u c h e m p l o y e e o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t h e 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f , a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f , g r i e v a n c e s . 
S i g n e d o n t h e 14 th d a y o f August ,. 1979 
Albany, New York 
H a r o l d R. N e w m a n , C h a i r m a n 
#2H - 8 /15/79 
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STATE OF NEW YC 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
,ALLEGANY COUNTY, 
Employer, 
-and-
NEW YORK COUNCIL 66, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
-and- Petitioner/ 
NEW YORK STATE NURSES ASSOCIATION, 
Tntp-nrPTinr. 
#2G - 8/15/79 
Case No. C-1903 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the New York State Nurses 
Association 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above named public, employer, in the unit agreed upon by 
the parties and described below,, as their exclusive representa-
tive for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settle-
ment .of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employees licensed to practice as a 
registered professional nurse. 
Excluded: Public Health Administrator 
Supervisory Public Health Nurse 
Director of Patient Services 
Further, JLT iS ORDERED that the above named public 
employer shall negotiate collectively with the New York State 
Nurses Association 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall ' 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed onthe 14th day of August , 19 79. 
Albany, New York 
^4x?^L^^ ^ ,^/^C y^-y~>-» 
Harold R. Newman,' 'Chairman 
PER3 58.3 
=^ &L-, fctid^. 
Ida Klaus, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIC. BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BINGHAMTON-JOHNSON CITY JOINT SEWAGE BOARD, 
Employer, 
- and - . , 
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
- and -
LOCAL UNION #826, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
#2F - 8/15/79 
Case No. C-1906 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted.in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a . 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
| Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
j Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
| IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Water Pollution Control Employees' 
! Association 
i " 
•.has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
', of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by 
the parties and described below, as their exclusive representa-
tive for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settle-
ment of. grievances. 
Unit: Included: 
Excluded: 
Sewage plant operator, sewage plant operator trainee, 
sewage plant mechanic, instrumentation mechanic, 
laboratory technician and maintenance man. 
Chief sewage plant operator,.senior sewage plant 
operator and chemist. 
| F u r t h e r , IT IS ORDERED t h a t t h e above named p u b l i c 
i employer, s h a l l n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y wi th Water Pollution Control Employees' Association 
j and e n t e r i n t o a w r i t t e n agreement wi th such employee o r g a n i z a t i o n | wi th r ega rd t o terms and c o n d i t i o n s of employment, and s h a l l 
i n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y wi th such employee o r g a n i z a t i o n in t h e | . d e t e r m i n a t i o n of, and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of, g r i e v a n c e s . . ! 
ji Signed on t h e l 4 t h d a y ' o f August , 19 79 
l| Albany^ New York 
>ERB 58.3 
T ^ ^ ^ . . S&A&. ^^y^v^CL^. 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
r^*^ /b&^. 
Ida Kla«s , Member 
David C 
/ ' 
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STATE OF NEW YO 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OP CARMEL, 
Employer, 
- and-
LOCAL 456, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OP 
TEAMSTERS, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
TOWN OP CARMEL UNIT, PUTNAM COUNTY 840, 
CSEA, INC., 
Intervenor. 
#2E-8/15/79 
Case No. C-I762 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having' been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act .and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to,the authority vested in the Board by the • 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS'HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 456, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by 
the parties and described below, as their exclusive representa-
tive for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settle-
ment of grievances. 
Unit Included:'- Laborer and. Foreman 
Excluded: All other Titles 
Further, I T I S ORDERED that the above named public 
employer shall negotiate collectively with Local 456 
International' Brotherhood of Teamsters 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment,.and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the
 1i ( t h day of August • 19 79 
Albany, N.Y. \st/e-{, *cA-Harold R. Newman,'Chairman 
cgg€f«_- /Q^6t^-
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Membe: 
PERB 58.3 
PERB 58.3: 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIG.. BOARD 
In the Matter of 
METROPOLITAN SUBURBAN BUS AUTHORITY, 
-and- Employer, 
WILLIAM CAFEE and FRANCIS RAGONA, 
-and- Petitioners, 
#2D - 8/15/79 
Case No. C-.18 9( 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, 
LOCAL 252, AFL-CIO, 
-and- Intervenor, 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION LOCAL 1181-1061., 
AFL-CIO, Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED•that the Transport Workers Union 
of America, Local 252, AFL-CIO 
has been1 designated and selected by a majority of the.employees' 
of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by 
the parties and described below, as their exclusive representa-
tive for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settle-
ment of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Lead Mechanics; Technician Mechanics; Classes 
I, II, III, IV, and V Mechanics; Class I Body Mechanics; Class I 
Register Mechanics; Class II Stock Room Mechanics;' Class V(i) 
Interior Cleaners; and Bus Operators. 
Excluded: All other employees employed by the Metropolitan 
Suburban Bus Authority. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public j 
employer shall negotiate collectively with the Transport i 
Workers Union of American, Local 252, AFL-CIO. j 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization; 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. • ! 
j Signed on the 14th day of August , ig7 
S Albany, N.Y. 
Harold R. Newman, Chai C^r-iw&^u^ ha i rman 
g ^ j , /rHAs-A^>±, 
I d a Kla-us, Member 
David w 
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